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This paper examines Lockie’s theory of libertarian self-determinism 
in light of the question of prediction: “Can we know (or justifiably 
believe) how an agent will act, or is likely to act, freely?” I argue 
that, when Lockie's theory is taken to its full logical extent, free 
actions cannot be predicted to any degree of accuracy because, even 
if they have probabilities, these cannot be known. However, I 
suggest that this implication of his theory is actually advantageous, 
because it is able to explain and justify an important feature of the 
practices we use to determine whether someone has acted culpably: 
our hostility to the use of predictive evidence. 
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Some philosophers arrive at the free will question from an ontological 
starting point (for example, “What kind of freedom exists, if any?” or 
“What are its conditions?”). Others arrive from an ethical starting point 
(for example, “How should I treat myself or others when we fail to do what 
we ought to?”). By contrast, Lockie takes a refreshing epistemic stance — 
based on the forceful transcendental argument for libertarianism that his 
book presents — and questions how epistemic norms affect the arguments 
we can use to support metaphysical claims about free will. Here, I would 
like to focus on the specific account of libertarianism that he proposes: his 
theory of self-determination (outlined mainly in Chapter 9). I will examine 
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his account in light of a different epistemic question, that of prediction: 
“Can we know (or justifiably believe) how an agent will act, or is likely to 
act, freely?” I would argue that, when Lockie’s self-determinism is taken 
to its full logical extent, free actions cannot be predicted to any degree of 
accuracy on the basis of anything other than previous free actions, because 
even if they have probabilities, these cannot be known. While Lockie 
himself seems to accept the view that free actions may be predictable, I 
argue that this view cannot be accommodated with other parts of his theory, 
hence he needs to choose between freedom and predictability. 
Furthermore, I would like to suggest that this implication of his theory, that 
free actions cannot be predicted, is actually advantageous: it is able to 
explain an important feature of the practices we use to determine whether 
someone has acted culpably––particularly, though not only, in criminal 
trials.  
 
I start by arguing that, to be epistemically warranted, predictions need to 
rely on causal generalisations. I then turn to Lockie’s self-determinism and 
examine whether the agent’s character traits, reasons, and objective 
probabilities, or maybe even the agent as a whole, may be used to anchor 
such causal generalisations. Lastly, I briefly explain the hostility of 
Common Law to predictive evidence and suggest that libertarian theories 
that renounce the idea that free actions have discoverable objective 
probabilities are able to account for this hostility. 
 
 
2. Why Predictions Require Causal Generalisations 
 
Inferences from a known to an unknown empirical fact involve a 
generalisation about types. Schauer, for example, holds that “the avoidance 
of generalizations is, with few or no qualifications, simply not possible at 
all” (Schauer 2003, 101). In some cases, the reference to the generalisation 
is made explicitly. For example, inferring that Socrates is mortal from our 
knowledge that human beings are mortal refers explicitly to a 
generalisation about human beings as a type. However, in many cases the 
generalisation is implicit in the inference. Consider, for example, an 
inference from the fact that a person reacted allergically to a certain cat to 
the fact that this individual is likely to react allergically to that same cat in 
future. This knowledge implies one or more generalisations that could 
serve as the basis for the inference (for example, the type of person who 
once reacted allergically to cats is likely to continue to react allergically). 
The important point is that drawing an inference from one empirical fact 
to another presupposes a generalisation about types of fact that connects 
the fact from which the inference begins to the fact with which the 
inference ends. Without this presupposition, the inference is invalid 
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because it remains unclear what licenses the move from the first fact to the 
second.  
 
I contend that inferences from a known to an unknown empirical fact 
require a causal generalisation — that is, a generalisation that reflects a 
causal connection between the type of fact from which the inference begins 
and the type of fact the inference seeks to establish. If an inference is based 
on a non-causal generalisation, a mere correlation, it is unlicensed and thus 
invalid (this claim is part of the Common Cause Principle, see Reichenbach 
1999, 157-166; Arntzenius 1992). The causal relation can operate either 
directly or through a common cause. For instance, inferring that a smoker 
is likelier to contract cancer than a non-smoker is based on a causal 
generalisation that smoking is a cause of (lung) cancer. By contrast, 
inferring that a Coca-Cola drinker is likelier to contract cancer than a non-
drinker involves a causal generalisation that reflects a common cause. It is 
living in a hot country that is the common cause of both Coca-Cola 
drinking and (skin) cancer. I do not argue that, for the inference to be valid, 
it is necessary to specify the (direct or indirect) causal generalisation; I only 
argue that the existence of such a causal generalisation has to be 
presupposed.  
 
Consider the opposite stance, according to which a mere correlation 
between two types of fact can suffice to infer an unknown from a known 
fact, without making any commitment about the existence or kind of causal 
connection between these types of fact. Such a stance would still require 
that the generalisation on which a valid inference is based satisfy certain 
conditions or standards, such as statistical significance. The difficulty with 
such a stance is that it renders the rejection of spurious correlations more 
difficult. Spurious correlations are those that do not reflect any actual 
connection (be they causal or not) between the two types of fact. Consider 
the correlation between the number of people who drowned by falling into 
a swimming pool during a given period of years and the number of films 
in which Nicolas Cage appeared, in that same period (Vigen 2015). The 
lack of any actual connection between these facts means that this spurious 
correlation does not hold outside the group of initially-observed cases. It 
would hence be a mistake to infer anything about the number of people 
who drowned from the number of Nicholas Cage films (or vice versa) in a 
year that is not included in the group of years within which the correlation 
was identified. Drawing any inference from a spurious correlation to an 
unobserved case is therefore unlicensed and misleading, whatever the 
purpose of the inquiry is (be it to obtain knowledge, provide an 
explanation, or make a prediction about unobserved cases). Identifying a 
reliable process to ensure that a given correlation is not spurious is 
therefore essential, because spurious correlations are so widespread — 
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indeed, they are bound to be ever-present. Since each specific case consists 
of innumerable details (most of which are, of course, unimportant), one 
could sift through a vast number of facts until one finds a group in which 
the identified fact correlates with the fact that one seeks to establish. For 
example, one might find a correlation between a certain type of action and 
the second (or third) letter of the person’s great-aunt’s surname.  
 
If one accepts that inferences require causal generalisations, one can apply 
methods to distinguish between causal and non-causal connection to 
identify which generalisations are spurious (for the various sophisticated 
methods that have been proposed, such as the Markov Condition and 
Bayesian Nets, see Williamson 2005). However, if one denies that 
inferences require causal generalisations, one ought to find how to 
distinguish between informative and spurious correlations. Note that mere 
statistical significance will not do, because testing sufficiently large 
numbers of variables using sufficiently large databases would eventually 
generate statistically significant (yet spurious) generalisations. One might 
wish that such absurd, albeit statistically-significant, correlations simply 
did not exist. But this wish relies on the assumption that statistically-
significant correlations need to “make sense” — that is, that it would be 
possible to explain why this correlation holds; and what would such an 
explanation be, if not causal or causal-like?  
 
One might challenge this argument using counterexamples in which an 
inference from a known to an unknown fact is made without presupposing 
a causal connection between the types of fact. For example, if there are ten 
balls in a jar, of which nine are blue, it might be possible to infer that the 
probability of a randomly-chosen ball’s being blue is 90%, without 
presupposing any causal connection between “being in that jar” and “being 
blue”. 
  
However, even if not all factual inferences require a causal connection to 
be presupposed, the inferences drawn in legal fact-finding almost always 
do. Denying an underlying causal connection is easier when the 
generalisation is extracted from a group of cases to which the specific case 
at hand belongs. It is important to note that the randomly-chosen ball is, 
itself, one of the ten balls in the jar. It might thus be possible to draw some 
inferences about it without presupposing anything about the relation 
between the types of fact. While such inferences raise a set of difficult 
problems (Hájek 2009), these differ in kind from those involved in drawing 
inferences from generalisations that do not include the case at hand. To 
infer the probability that a randomly-chosen ball will be blue from the 
proportion of blue balls in another jar, it is necessary to presuppose that 
there is some substantial relation between “being in a jar” and “being blue”. 
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And, again, if this substantial relation is not causal or causal-like, what else 
could it be? 
 
 
3. The Predictability of Self-determined Actions 
 
Instructive hints on the predictability of self-determined actions can be 
found in Lockie’s discussion of Dennett’s character-based example of a 
person who is unable to torture an innocent for $10 (Lockie 2018, 216). 
Let us ignore Milgram’s experiments and assume, with Dennett, that this 
is, indeed, a paradigmatic example of an action (or omission) that is 
determined. Dennett uses this example to argue that the fact that the 
person’s actions are determined (in this example, by his moral nature) does 
not undermine freedom. Dennett seems to rely on an intuition that this 
person acts freely when he does not torture. I do not share this intuition. 
My view is that the person’s omission, if so determined, is unfree because 
they had no reason to torture (and it therefore seems to me that they deserve 
no praise for this omission — though I will not pursue this point here). 
Lockie, however, agrees with Dennett that the person’s omission to torture 
for $10 is free. He explains: “I may be unable to deviate from a path that I, 
my moral nature, has determined” (ibid.). However, he insists that 
Dennett’s example fails to establish compatibilism, because the individual 
could still be free even if so determined: “Ethical responsibility […] is 
something that requires freedom from determination by the Big Bang and 
laws of nature precisely in order to preserve the possibility of self-
attributable axiological determination: of the agent determining acts in 
accordance with his moral nature and responsiveness to moral (and other) 
reasons” (ibid.). 
 
I would argue that Lockie’s agreement with Dennett cannot be settled with 
the rest of his theory, hence Lockie needs to accept that the person’s 
omission to torture is unfree. More generally, I would suggest that Lockie 
has no theoretical resources to explain how actions may be both free and 
predictable based on anything other than the agent’s own previous free 
actions. I would seek to establish this claim by discussing a related 
question: while Lockie discusses the matter of whether this omission could 
be both free and determined (by the person’s moral nature), I would like 
to question whether this omission could be both free and predictable. I 
assume that, if any human actions and omissions are predictable, a person’s 
omission to torture for $10 must be one of them, even if nothing is known 
about the previous actions of that person. As I have already argued, this 
prediction must rely on a causal generalisation. Consequently, the question 
revolves around what the relatum of the causal connection that this 




The first possibility is that the person’s “moral nature” is the relatum, 
causing the agent to refrain from torturing an innocent. Moral nature itself 
could be the relatum, or it could consist of some propensities, traits, and so 
on, one of which determines the agent’s omission. Whatever the exact 
relatum is, under this option, moral nature (or one of its components) is 
ontologically distinct from the agent. Such a view could easily explain the 
predictability of this omission: to have a certain moral nature either implies 
or consists of the predictable tendency of the agent to act in a certain way. 
For example, to be a kind-natured person is to have a higher likelihood of 
performing kind actions (compared to another person who is of an unkind 
nature). However, Lockie rightly rejects moral nature as the relatum that 
causes the agent’s omission. He asks: “whatever the conative part was that 
determined your choice, was this in turn determined by natural law or by 
chance?”, to which he answers: “persons, not their parts, determine 
choices” (ibid., 196). Lockie makes this move to fend off Hobbes’ regress 
objection: if some part of the person determined the choice, what 
determined that part? Consequently, Lockie objects to “an ontologically 
real, prior and separable item in the chooser called an act of will — 
historically: a ‘desire’, or sometimes ‘volition’” (ibid.) As a result, 
according to Lockie, neither moral nature, nor any other part of the agent’s 
character, can be the causal relatum on which predictions would be based. 
  
The second possibility is that the predictability of the refusal to torture is 
based on the person’s reasons. Perhaps these could explain why it is so 
predictable that they would refuse to torture an innocent for $10. While 
their reason for doing so is weak ($10), they have plenty of forceful reasons 
to avoid torturing. But Lockie seems to take the view that reasons are not 
causes: “For [reasons] to play a role, they don’t associatively cause action 
and cognition. They enter a mind and become active in interaction in that 
mind. The mind (the agent, the person, the self) decides — in active 
assimilation, accommodation and equilibration of that agent’s reasons” 
(ibid., 207). Yet, if reasons have no independent causal power, they cannot 
constitute the relatum in the causal generalisations needed to make our 
predictions warranted.  
 
Moving to the third possibility, perhaps the predictability of self-
determined actions could be rooted in objective probabilities. One helpful 
way to understand objective probabilities, for our purposes, is as free-
standing ontological entities (otherwise, it is unclear how they could be the 
relatum in the causal generalisations on which warranted predictions are 
based). Consider the predictability of the radioactive decay of a certain 
unstable atom. Let us assume that this atom, X, has a probability, Y, of 
decaying in the next second. Let us assume further that this is not a 
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subjective probability — even if we know everything that could possibly 
be known about this atom and the laws of nature, we would still be unable 
to predict with certainty whether this atom will decay in the next second. 
However, we can still predict that X will decay with a certain probability. 
After we observe enough cases of such atoms, we could generalise that the 
probability that X will decay in the next second is Y. The closer our 
prediction gets to the objective probability, the more accurate it is. This 
prediction is warranted because it is based on a causal generalisation in 
which objective probabilities are either the relatum or part of it: the 
objective probability is ontologically distinct from the other parts of the 
causal relations. It either causes the effect directly or it allows other 
potential causes to bring about the effect (or prevents them from doing so). 
 
If free actions have such ontologically-distinct objective probabilities, they 
could warrant our predictions. If there is an objective probability that the 
agent will torture an innocent for $10, and that probability is zero or close 
to zero, it could anchor our prediction. Under this view, predicting that the 
person is not going to torture is warranted, because it is based on a causal 
generalisation in which objective probabilities are part of the causal 
relatum that, together with the agent, determines the action. The person’s 
inability to torture is basically a prediction that reflects this close-to-zero 
objective probability that they would torture. 
  
However, if objective probabilities are such free-standing ontological 
entities, they cannot help make the agent’s action self-determined. On the 
contrary, they would get in the way. Based on James, Lockie distinguishes 
between positive and negative chances. A positive chance is “a true 
generator of randomness in the world”, which is inserted “into, or over, or 
at, the origin of our acts” (ibid., 197). Such a chance is “destructive of 
freedom and responsibility” because “responsibility for our actions as 
remained to us would be just that degree of determination of our actions as 
was robust enough to survive this chaos, this noise, these gremlins. The 
more noise, the less we would determine action — the less we could be 
said to act at all” (ibid., 197-8). By contrast, a negative chance “is simply 
an absence of determination by any positive force external to the agent 
himself” (ibid., 198, original emphasis). So Lockie rules out the type of 
chance required for rooting our predictions in objective probabilities, at 
least when they are understood as free-standing ontological entities. 
 
Let us take stock: predicting the agent’s free actions requires a causal 
generalisation, but neither the agent’s character traits and propensities, nor 
their reasons, nor even ontologically-separable objective probabilities 
could be used as the relatum. The fourth and last possibility I can think of 
is that the relatum consists of the agent himself, as a whole. Being an 
Amit Pundik 
 128
agent–causalist myself, I find this view very plausible — but the question 
is how such a view would account for predictions. Can such an agent have 
objective probabilities that are integral to them, making them who they 
are, rather than being “ontologically real, prior and separable items”? I 
would argue that, even if such objective probabilities were somehow 
possible, it would not matter for any practical purpose; in particular, it 
would not warrant our predictions. This is because such objective 
probabilities, even if they do exist, cannot be known.  
 
When distinguishing the agent’s character from their reasons, Lockie 
emphasises that “[t]he person’s character is, in a significant sense, 
ontologically unique, prior and fundamental” (ibid., 207). I take it that, 
when Lockie refers to “the person’s character” he means the agent as a 
whole, in an attempt to distinguish the agent from their reasons: “… what 
it is to have the character of the one isn’t just to be built up out of (‘bundled 
out of’) different, and different-strength, ‘reasons’ — it is to be 
ontologically different; it is to be a different person” (ibid., 206). It is little 
wonder that Lockie emphasises uniqueness: if an agent is self-determined, 
and not subject to any natural law, what would be the basis for assuming 
that one self-determined agent will determine themselves similarly to 
another, if there is no external law to govern their conduct? But if the agent, 
person, or character is unique, how could we predict what the agent will 
do freely, if we cannot draw any inference from observations about other 
similar people? 
 
One might respond that we could still predict that the person is not going 
to torture an innocent for $10, based on his previous actions. However, this 
response does not help to reconcile Lockie’s agreement with Dennett with 
the rest of his theory, because Dennett’s example seems to work even in 
cases in which the prediction that the person will refuse to torture for $10 
is not based on their previous actions. I can step into my classroom on the 
first day of the academic year, knowing virtually nothing about the 150-or-
so students there, and yet predict that they would not torture an innocent 
for $10. If predictions are warranted only based on my knowledge of 
previous actions, then it is unclear how this prediction is warranted. More 
generally, setting aside cases in which a free action is predicted based on 
the agent’s previous actions, Lockie has no resources to explain how 
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4. Is Unpredictability of Free Actions a Disadvantage for Lockie’s 
Theory? 
 
A constitutive feature of libertarian theories of free will is the claim that, 
if the agent’s action were (fully) determined by antecedent causal factors 
outside their control, they would be neither free to do, nor culpable for 
doing, what they did. Yet, libertarians tend to accept the view that the 
agent’s free actions have objective probabilities (van Inwagen 2000, 14-
18; O’Connor 2000, 97; 2009, 197), and that position is rarely challenged 
(for exceptions, see Vicens 2016; Sela 2017). If Lockie’s self-determined 
actions cannot be predictable, as I argued in the previous section, this 
implication of his theory might be viewed as a serious problem, even by 
those who are sympathetic to his libertarian inclinations. By contrast, my 
view is that accepting unpredictability as a necessary condition of free will 
may assist libertarian theories to overcome some of the common objections 
levelled against them.1 In the remainder of this paper, I would like to 
suggest that accepting this implication of Lockie’s self-determinism has 
the advantage of being able to explain an important feature of the practices 
used to determine whether someone has acted culpably — particularly, but 
not exclusively, in criminal trials. 
 
While I believe that the following analysis is applicable more widely, to 
legal and non-legal practices of determining culpability alike, I focus here 
on the former because they include explicit and well-specified rules. I take 
legal practices in criminal trials to offer the most suitable case study 
because criminal punishment is clearly constrained by culpability, at least 
if criminal law seeks to avoid punishing those who are not culpable for 
their actions. This constraint does not imply retributivism — namely, that 
punishment is inflicted because it is deserved. Instead, any theory of 
punishment that considers culpability to be a constraint on other legitimate 
goals of punishment should refrain from knowingly convicting the 
innocent.2 Hence, criminal proceedings constitute the clearest context in 
which culpability is attributed. I also assume, like many theorists of free 
will, that acting freely or with some kind of control is a necessary condition 
of culpability. While some might hold that our practices of attributing 
culpability do not require us to settle the metaphysical problem of free will 
(Strawson 1962), I share the position that the distinction between justified 
and unjustified attribution of culpability — which any theory of culpability 
 
1 For example, unpredictability may assist libertarians to overcome van Inwagen’s rollback 
argument. See Bernáth and Tőzsér (2019).  
2  One notable example of such a theory is Hart’s mixed theory, which accepts the 
retributivist constraint (“only those who have broken the law—and voluntarily broken it—
may be punished”) while rejecting retributivism as the “General Justifying Aim of the 
system” (Hart 2008, 9).  
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seems to need — is likely to rely on (or bring through the back door) 
notions very similar to “freedom” and “control” (Tadros 2005, 69).  
 
The scope of my discussion is restricted in one important respect. Some 
culpable actions may cause the agent to perform further actions that may 
be both predictable and culpable (getting drunk voluntarily and then 
driving dangerously). The agent’s culpability for the latter seems to be 
derived from their culpability for the former. When, how, and why 
culpability for one action is derived from another are complicated issues to 
address, and it is particularly questionable whether the agent’s culpability 
goes beyond their culpability for the first action. Be that as it may, such 
derivatively-culpable actions are outside the scope of this paper. I will 
therefore not discuss here evidence of planning, preparation, and motive 
(because, in such cases, the evidence may be probative of the alleged crime 
by establishing an earlier free decision that caused both the creation of the 
predictive evidence and the later commission of the crime). 
 
When determining, in criminal proceedings, whether an individual 
performed a certain culpable action, predictive evidence is often ignored.3 
Most apparently, and with only a few exceptions, base-rates are excluded 
(Koehler 2002). Using such evidence in court also seems intuitively 
problematic. For example, using the high rate of crimes involving illegal 
firearms in a certain neighbourhood to support the conviction of an 
individual resident in a crime involving an illegal firearm (henceforth, the 
“crime-rates scenario”) seems highly objectionable. The objection to base-
rates is not only aimed at the sufficiency of such evidence (on the grounds 
that “crime-rates are insufficient on their own to prove that the individual 
is guilty”). The objection also requires that such evidence not be used at all 
in determining the individual’s guilt: that crime-rates be inadmissible in 
criminal proceedings. 4  The hostility of criminal fact-finding toward 
predictive evidence is also apparent in the deeply-rooted suspicion of bad 
character and previous convictions.5  
 
3 I rely on Uviller’s distinction between trace and predictive evidence: the former results 
from a past event that leaves some traces in the present (e.g. eyewitnesses, fingerprints), 
while the latter “looks forward from an established event or trait to predict the likely 
repetition of its occurrence” (Uviller 1982, 847).  
4 This intuitive objection to admissibility distinguishes this example from the lottery and 
preface paradoxes in epistemology and the gate-crasher and prisoners paradoxes in legal 
theory. I have argued elsewhere that the latter are confusing and unhelpful; see Pundik 
(2017, 192-193). 
5 “English law’s suspicion of bad character and extraneous misconduct evidence has been 
cultivated for many centuries. It is deeply embedded in English judicial culture and 
institutions, and has frequently been actively propounded and celebrated” (Roberts and 
Zuckerman 2010, 586). 
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Legal scholarship contains various accounts that seek to justify the 
exclusion of such predictive evidence. The first kind of strategy, which has 
received the most scholarly attention, aims to identify an epistemic 
deficiency in the inference made from predictive evidence to the specific 
case. The inference is lacking: in weight (Cohen 1977, 74); appropriate 
causal connection (Thomson 1986); case-specificity (Stein 2005, 64-106); 
ability to provide the best explanation (Dant 1988; Allen and Pardo 2008); 
immunity to the problem of the reference class (Allen and Pardo 2007); or 
sensitivity to the truth (Enoch et al. 2012).6 I am unconvinced by these 
epistemic accounts, because I think that not only does each one suffer from 
its own problems (Pundik 2008a), but they all share some common 
deficiencies (Pundik 2011; see also Schoeman 1987 and Redmayne 2008). 
For example, why should the very same inference that is condemned as 
epistemically objectionable nevertheless be good enough for prediction 
purposes? If the inference suffers from some epistemic deficiency, this 
deficiency arises not only in the context of conviction but also in that of 
prediction. 
 
The second kind of strategy seeks to identify something in the legal context 
that makes some uses of predictive evidence objectionable, such as the 
rituality of the legal process (Tribe 1971), the over-transparency of 
standards of proof (Nesson 1985), equality between litigants (Stein 2005, 
105), and the individuality and autonomy of the litigant against whom the 
evidence is used (Wasserman 1992; Zuckerman 1986). Proponents of this 
type of account share the view that, even if such evidence may be useful in 
other contexts (science, policymaking, and so on), its use in legal fact-
finding conflicts with fundamental values of the legal system. I believe 
that, while there are specific problems with each of these accounts,7 they 
capture something significant about predictive evidence because their 
strategy easily explains why the appropriateness of using this evidence 
depends fundamentally on the purpose for which it is used. 
 
In previous work,8 I have suggested a contextualist account that is based 
on culpability. According to this “culpability account”, some types of 
 
6 The reference is to the epistemic explanation appearing in the first part of their paper, 
although, in the second, they argue that epistemic considerations do not suffice to exclude 
predictive evidence, and later propose an alternative account based on primary incentives.  
7 See Schoeman (1987). For criticism of Nesson and Tribe’s accounts, see Shaviro (1989). 
For criticism of Wasserman’s, see Pundik (2008b). For criticism of Stein’s, see, e.g., 
Pundik (2006).  
8 This section rehearses the argument I made in Pundik (2017). Given the complexity of the 
issues involved (causation, free will, and so on), I chose to repeat the argument itself in full 
but to remove some of the more nuanced qualifications. Readers who are not familiar with 
that paper and are left with some concerns about the claims made might find replies in there. 
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generalisation about human conduct presuppose that the individual’s 
conduct was determined by a certain causal factor that rendered their 
conduct unfree. By contrast, in the context of attributing culpability, it is 
necessary to presuppose the exact opposite: that the accused was free to 
determine their own conduct. Using these types of generalisation to 
determine culpability is objectionable, because it involves contradicting 
presuppositions about the individual’s conduct.  
 
In Section 2, I argued that inferences about human conduct require reliance 
on causal generalisations. But, even if they do, why can free actions not be 
proven with such generalisations? Starting with a simple example, assume 
that Richard is exposed to radiation of a particular kind, which affects his 
nervous system, resulting in blotches all over his skin and an irresistible 
urge to attack everyone around him. Assume further that every person 
exposed to this radiation develops these symptoms. When Richard is 
admitted to hospital, it seems unproblematic to infer from the blotches that, 
given the opportunity, he will go berserk and should therefore be 
restrained. However, inferring from these blotches that a violent action that 
had taken place before Richard arrived at the hospital was committed by 
him (rather than by someone else), for the purpose of convicting him of a 
violent offence, seems intuitively problematic. 
  
According to the culpability account, this inference should not be used for 
the purpose of determining culpability, because it leads to a contradiction. 
To infer from Richard’s skin blotches that he had acted violently, it is 
necessary to presuppose a causal generalisation: either one caused the 
other or they both have a common cause. In this example, the radiation 
caused both Richard’s blotches and his violent conduct. However, 
Richard’s acting violently may be culpable only if he acted freely. The 
culpability account is based on a libertarian theory of free will, which holds 
that people do not act freely when their conduct is determined by 
antecedent conditions outside their control. Establishing Richard’s guilt by 
inferring from the blotches on his skin that it was he who acted violently 
is, therefore, contradictory: Richard’s conduct is treated as free and unfree 
at the same time. 
 
Blaming Richard for a violent action, having inferred his conduct from the 
blotches, is problematic, since such an inference cannot be used without 
dissolving his culpability. Similarly, if the inference is used to predict that 
Richard will act violently, it is only at the price of implying that his violent 
conduct will not be culpable. This example also explains why the very 
same inference seems unproblematic when restraining him in the hospital. 
While inferring from the blotches that Richard will act violently in the 
hospital presupposes that his conduct is determined (and hence unfree), 
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this leads to no contradiction because, in the medical context, it is not 
necessary to presuppose that Richard’s violent conduct will be culpable.  
 
Moving to probabilistic generalisations, consider the following variation 
on the previous example. Assume that Stephen is exposed to another type 
of radiation, which affects the nervous system and always causes certain 
skin blotches but causes an irresistible urge to attack others, when the 
opportunity arises, in only 80 per cent of cases. There are at least two ways 
to understand how this generalisation reflects the underlying causal 
relation between the radiation and the agent’s conduct. According to the 
subjective interpretation of probability, which is commonly considered the 
most suitable for legal purposes,9 probabilistic generalisations reflect the 
limited state of our knowledge rather than the true nature of the world. 
While the generalisation about the radiation is probabilistic, it imperfectly 
reflects a reality that may be deterministic. If the world is indeed 
deterministic, Stephen belongs to one of two possible sub-groups. One 
possibility is that he belongs to the sub-group of people who possess an 
extra unknown variable, which, together with the radiation, determines that 
he will go berserk. The other possibility is that he belongs to the sub-group 
of people who do not possess the extra variable, in which case the exposure 
to the radiation will not cause him to go berserk. 
  
If Stephen possesses the extra variable, supporting his conviction by 
inferring from the blotches on his skin that he was (80 per cent) likely to 
have acted violently is problematic. Similarly to deterministic 
generalisations, such an inference leads to a contradiction. His conduct is 
taken to be both free (in order to be culpable) and unfree (as, together with 
another unknown variable, his violent actions were determined by the 
radiation). To avoid the contradiction, either the evidence of the blotches 
has to be accepted as probative of the violent act’s having been committed 
by Stephen, in which case he is not culpable; or it has to be deemed not 
probative, in which case it should be ignored.  
 
If Stephen does not possess the extra variable, inferring from his blotches 
that he was (80 per cent) likely to have acted violently is mistaken and, 
hence, misleading. This is because, if he belongs to the sub-group of people 
who were not caused to act violently by the radiation, then the probability 
that he acted violently is not affected by the exposure to the radiation. 
Inferring from the skin blotches that he is more likely to have acted 
violently than he would have been, had he not presented these marks, is 
therefore mistaken. In sum, this inference is either contradictory, because 
 
9 For criminal law, see Alexander et al. (2009, 31); for tort law, see Perry (1995, 333-335); 
for health and safety regulation, see Adler (2005, 1247). 
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it requires inconsistent presuppositions, or it is misleading, because it is 
mistaken and yet is presented as informative.  
 
Using this evidence to support Stephen’s conviction is objectionable also 
under the objective interpretation.10 According to this interpretation, the 
radiation works in a genuinely indeterministic manner and it is impossible 
to know at the time of the exposure whether Stephen will go berserk. 
However, if Stephen is put to trial, the important question is whether the 
violent action, which is a given, was performed by Stephen or someone 
else. If the genuinely indeterministic radiation ultimately caused Stephen 
to go berserk, then his violent conduct was determined and not under his 
control. In such a scenario, the subjective and objective interpretations 
diverge on the question of whether the radiation, together with all relevant 
factors, determined Stephen’s violent conduct, or whether there was room 
for chance. However, under both interpretations, Stephen’s violent conduct 
was caused by a factor not under his control, and hence he was unfree and 
cannot be held culpable for it. By contrast, if the radiation did not 
ultimately cause Stephen to go berserk, then inferring from the blotches on 
his skin that he is likelier to have behaved violently is, again, mistaken. 
Therefore, inferring from the blotches that he was likelier to have acted 
violently is either inconsistent with his being culpable, or mistaken and 
hence misleading. 
 
The culpability account is able to provide a unifying justification for the 
hostility of criminal fact-finding toward predictive evidence. Returning to 
the crime-rates scenario, for an inference from crime-rates to the resident’s 
case to be valid, it is necessary to presuppose that there is a causal 
generalisation that licenses this inference, such as the dangerous character 
of the neighbourhood, its socio-economic conditions, and so on. Such 
causal factors are outside the control of the individual resident. Inferring 
from the crime-rates that the resident was likelier to have committed a 
crime involving an illegal firearm is either inconsistent with their being 
culpable, or mistaken. As a result, if the court draws such an inference, it 
implicitly concedes the presupposition that the accused did not act freely. 
In such a case, the court would also have to concede that the individual is 
not culpable (and should therefore be acquitted).11 Alternatively, if the 
court seeks to avoid the implications of this inference, it ought to deem it 
 
10 The discussion here is based on understanding the indeterminacy of the radiation as lying 
in the cause itself (Lewis 1986).  
11 That convicting an accused should not be based on contradictory presuppositions should 
not be confused with the stronger claim that every case of practical decision-making is 
subject to all epistemic norms, a claim I do not endorse. Nor is it assumed that holding 
contradictory beliefs is, in itself, morally wrong – only that it is wrong to rely on 
contradictory beliefs to treat someone as culpable.  
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irrelevant to the individual’s conduct and exclude the evidence adduced to 
substantiate it.  
 
The culpability account also supports common law’s traditional suspicion 
of previous convictions and yields some criticism of recent reforms. The 
rules and case law governing the admissibility of previous convictions are 
vast and complex, and I cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of them 
here. However, applying the culpability account to previous convictions of 
child molestation may serve as an example of how such an analysis might 
look. Previous convictions of child molestation are admissible in both the 
United Kingdom and the United States.12 While the admission of such 
previous convictions has been criticised on various grounds, such as being 
unconstitutional (Sheft 1995), unfair (McCandless 1997, 694), and even 
truth-supressing (Cowley and Colyer 2010), the connection to the issue of 
free will seems to have gone unnoticed. The culpability account would 
draw attention to the importance of identifying the exact generalisation 
involved and considering whether using it for conviction conflicts with 
other presuppositions made in criminal proceedings. Like any inference 
about human conduct, inferring from the accused’s previous convictions 
that they are likelier to have committed the alleged similar offence(s) relies 
on a causal generalisation. For example, these previous convictions may 
be probative because they indicate that the accused suffers from a 
condition, such as perversion, illness, or addiction, that raises the 
probability of reoffending. According to the culpability account, if these 
previous convictions are indeed probative, it might be at the price of 
exposing that the accused’s conduct is unfree and thus nonculpable. 
 
One might retort that my analysis stands in contrast to a common intuitive 
view of criminal responsibility. While the analysis implies that the agent’s 
conduct is either fully determined or entirely unaffected, the practices of 
assigning criminal responsibility often seem to assume that an agent can 
be partially causally influenced. The agent is treated as causally influenced 
by some factor, but only to some degree, leaving them with a less-than-
maximum extent of criminal responsibility. For example, a paedophile’s 
sentence might be mitigated by the fact that he was a victim of molestation 
in his childhood. According to this view, the mitigation acknowledges that 
his childhood experience causally influenced the way he currently acts, yet 




12 For the United Kingdom, see the Criminal Justice Act 2003, c 44, pt 11, ch 1, s 103, and 
for the United States, see Rule 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
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The difficulty with this view of criminal responsibility is that it fails to 
account for the conviction stage of the trial, which seeks a binary outcome: 
the accused is either guilty of the alleged crime or not. Finding him guilty 
requires that he is culpable of committing the crime, which, in turn, 
requires that he acted freely. Free action is thus a precondition of criminal 
responsibility, and, when undermined by a defence such as insanity or 
duress, the accused is found not guilty rather than less guilty. 
 
One means of explaining away the intuitive force of this view of criminal 
responsibility is to note that, while the question of guilt is binary, the 
consequences of conviction are typically scalar. The punishment could 
include a longer or shorter period of imprisonment or a heftier or lighter 
fine. It is at the sentencing stage that the paedophile’s childhood experience 
is taken into consideration. However, there could be various explanations 
for why this experience serves to mitigate the appropriate punishment that 
make no reference to a partial causal influence. To mention just a few 
alternatives, there would be the increased effect that punishment would 
have on him as a result of his experience, his vulnerability to becoming a 
victim again during imprisonment, or maybe even the attempt to 
compensate him for his bad fortune in childhood. 
 
Whatever the justification may be, it need not rely on a causal 
generalisation, according to which his childhood experience causally 
influenced him to commit the alleged offence. Moreover, if such a causal 
generalisation is used at the sentencing stage, it becomes difficult to 
explain why the prosecution should not be allowed to admit the very same 
evidence at the conviction stage to support its allegation that the accused 
has committed the offence. The challenge here is not only to identify a 
solid objection to the use of such evidence in criminal trials (which is more 
difficult than it might seem), but also to explain why the same objection is 
not equally applicable at the sentencing stage. While exploring the 
justification for such mitigation lies outside the scope of this paper, it 
suffices to note that taking into account the paedophile’s childhood 
experiences at the sentencing stage need not be based on his being less 
responsible for molesting the children he did. Therefore, my analysis does 
not stand in contrast to current sentencing practices. On the contrary, the 
“partial causal influences” view stands in contrast to our binary practices 
of conviction. Proponents of such a view would thus need to explain how 










Accepting that many free actions are necessarily unpredictable might be 
viewed as implausible and counterintuitive, even by libertarians such as 
Lockie. Yet, it seems that Lockie’s self-determinism cannot be settled with 
the predictability of free actions. While I tend to think that, if free will 
exists, it is necessarily unpredictable, I did not pursue this claim here. 
Rather, I suggested that a theory of free will in which free actions are 
necessarily unpredictable is able to provide the sought-after justification 
for excluding predictive evidence. So even if Lockie’s theory implies that 
self-determined actions are necessarily unpredictable, this might not be a 
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